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Security should be addressed across all sections. This section will address general security requirements, e.g. SDLC requirements, algorithm requirements etc.

IEC 62443

Threat Model

The GEISA Execution Environment inputs:

  • HAN Interface

    • Gateways

    • Smart Inverters

  • LAN Interface

  • Environmental Sensors

    • Temperature

    • Humidity

    • Accelerometer

    • Location (GPS)

  • Meter Register

  • Metrology Sensor

  • Provisioning Interfaces

    • Bluetooth

    • Thread

GEISA Execution Environment outputs:

  • HAN Interface

  • LAN Interface

  • Local Storage

  • Disconnect Switch(es)

Potential Threats and Causes

  • Malicious Firmware

    • Supply Chain Attack

    • Unpatched Components

    • Compromised Vendor

    • Compromised Employee Workstation

    • Compromised Management System

  • Vulnerable Network Interface

    • Poor Programming Practices

    • Inadequate Testing

    • Unpatched Components

    • Supply Chain Attack

  • Broken Firmware

    • Poor Programming Practices

    • Incorrect Logic

    • Inadequate Testing

    • Unpatched Components

  • Side Channel Attacks

  • Malicious Inputs

    • Forged data from Smart Inverters

    • Forged data from EVSE

    • Attack on the Provisioning Interface

  • Privilege Escalation

  • Isolation Escape

    • Attacker is able to escape isolation mechanism and access core environment

  • Direct Hardware Attack

    • Decap Chip

    • Access to programming interfaces

      • Replace Firmware

      • Retrieve and decompile firmware

    • Swap out the chip

  • Resource Exhaustion

    • CPU

    • Memory

    • Storage

    • HAN Communications

    • LAN Communications

  • Denial of Service

    • HAN Communications

    • LAN Communications

  • Peer-to-Peer Attacks

Potential Attacker Objectives

  • Access to the Utility Internal Network

  • Controlling the Remote Service Switch (or other actuator)

  • Attacking devices within the Home

  • Coordinated attacks across Homes

    • Note: there are papers which demonstrate that coordinated attacks on as little as 1% of the load can cause grid instability.

  • Manipulating readings (typically for theft)

  • Steal data (privacy, spying on customers etc.)

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